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This paper fills an important gap in the literature by exploring the trends 
in social welfare in four countries in the MENA region which have 
undertaken extensive economic liberalization programs under the 
auspices of the IMF and the World Bank, namely, Jordan, Egypt, 
Tunisia, and Morocco. Studying the experience of these countries 
provides a good opportunity to enhance the understanding of the link 
between economic reforms, the level of social welfare provision, and 
political stability. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3	  
	  
 
 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The outbreak of the Arab Spring in late 2010 came as a surprise only to 
Western powers and observers. To the Arab World it was “not 
unexpected and many indicators pointed in their direction” long before 
2010, including, for example, the strike of the Tunisian miners (Gafsa), 
the Egyptian mass strike in 2007-08 following hike in international food 
prices, and the protest of the new middle class organizations such as 
Kefaya in Egypt and National Committee of Military Veterans in 
Jordan1. One of the immediate outcomes of the Arab Spring has been the 
rise of political Islam. Like the Arab Spring itself, the rise of political 
Islam in countries like Tunisia, Morocco, and Egypt before the military 
quo that removed the former President Mohammed Morsi from power on 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1.	   Samir	   Amin. The People’s Spring: the future of the Arab revolution, 
Cape Town, Pambazuka Press,  
Amin, 2012, 2	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July 3 (2013) was totally unexpected by Western observers and policy 
makers (Harrigan and El-Said, 2010),  
For most Western observers, however, the Arab Spring and rise of 
political Islam are explained by political forces, namely, demands for 
“democracy,” political freedoms, and participation (Horovitz, 2011). This 
paper argues that economic factors, particularly deterioration in living 
standards, increased concentration of wealth, inflation and high prices, 
and lack of strong social safety nets to protect the middle class during 
reforms are key factors explaining the uprising. The roots of these 
problems are traced to the economic reforms, which many countries in 
the region have undertaken over the past three decades under the auspices 
of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank. Since the 
mid-1980s several Arab states, especially the resource-poor countries of 
the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), have undertaken economic 
reform programs supported by the IMF and the World Bank through 
policy-based loans such as stabilization and structural adjustment loans. 
In many other regions of the world especially in Latin America and sub-
Saharan Africa, such programs which were undertaken in the 1980s and 
the 1990s have resulted in a decline in social welfare (Cornia, Jolly, & 
Stewart, 1987; Mosley, Harrigan, & Toye, 1995) and growing 
inequalities (Stiglitz, 2002; Dunkley, 1997; Goldstein, 2000; Stewart, 
2000; CAFOD, 1998). However, the same phenomenon has received 
little attention in MENA.  
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This paper fills an important gap in the literature by exploring the trends 
in social welfare in four countries in the MENA region which have 
undertaken extensive economic liberalization programs under the 
auspices of the IMF and the World Bank, namely, Jordan, Egypt, 
Tunisia, and Morocco. These countries were chosen for two reasons. 
First, because of their prolonged adjustment efforts, and, second, because 
they are often put forward by the international financial institutions as 
cases of successful reformers, with regimes in Jordan, Morocco, and 
Tunisia generally perceived as the “most advanced” and “successful 
reformers” in the region (Shafiq, 1998, p. 8), “good pupils of the IMF” 
who followed its “commandments religiously” (Pfeifer, 1996, p. 40). 
Studying the experience of these countries with regard to economic 
reforms supported by international financial institutions provides a good 
opportunity to enhance understanding of the link between economic 
reforms, the level of social welfare provision, and political instability in 
the region and elsewhere.  
In particular, the paper seeks to investigate an important question, 
namely whether economic liberalization as promoted by the IMF and 
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World Bank has had a negative impact on formal social welfare 
provisions. Assuming this has been the case, one then would expect 
economic reforms to be associated with higher unemployment, poverty, 
and worsened inequities. The paper argues that by weakening social 
welfare provisions, promoters of economic reform (IMF and World 
Bank) undermined the most significant source of authority, which would 
have provided legitimacy not only to reforms, but also to the pro-western 
regimes of Egypt, Jordan, and Morocco, which the Washington 
institutions sought to support. The only exception is Tunisia, which 
refused to compromise the social aspect of reform. On the other hand, the 
weakening of social safety nets created a gap, which has been filled by 
the faith-based organizations through their vast charity network. This, we 
argue, played a key role in enhancing the legitimacy of political Islam at 
the expense of incumbent regimes.    
To investigate the link between economic liberalization and poverty, 
equity, and social welfare provisions, the paper relies on a detailed 
country-case study approach, and uses data from international agencies 
(such as the World Bank and the IMF), as well as national surveys. Since 
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both sets of data have limitations, using data from both international 
agencies and national surveys is deemed as a complimentary and 
appropriate approach to overcome the “limitations” of each data set 
(Adams & Page, 2003, 2027).  
We should also emphasize that while the paper does not ignore the pre-
1980s decades, its emphasis is mainly on the 1983 and 2004 period. The 
reason for the paper’s focus on the 1983-2004 period is due to the fact 
that the early and mid-1980s was associated with economic collapse and 
weakening of statist policies in place in the region since independence. 
This led to, and was followed by, a period of rapid economic reform, 
liberalization and transition to more market-oriented policies, especially 
among four countries studied in this paper (Iqbal, 2006; Adams & Page, 
2003). It is therefore appropriate to study the link between economic 
reform and social welfare provision through the experiences of Egypt, 
Jordan, Morocco, and Tunisia during this post-1983 transitional period. 
Finally, while the paper attempts to explain the causes of the Arab 
Spring, its does not include the main developments that occurred, and 
continue to occur in the post-Arab Spring era, since these remain 
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incomplete and are still unraveling. The paper’s analysis thus stops short 
of that period.    
 
2.  Economic Reform and Social Welfare 
In the period between independence and the economic collapse of the 
1980s, the four countries we studied, namely, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, 
and Tunisia all had a strong implicit social contract. Under this contract 
the state provided various forms of social welfare, including free health 
and education, subsidized food and utilities and guaranteed jobs in an 
overextended public sector. In return, this provisioning garnered loyalty 
from the population for the political regimes in power. This section of 
our paper looks at whether the period of economic reform under the IMF 
and World Bank led to a breakdown in this social contract with a 
retrenchment of the state in terms of social welfare provision and a 
worsening of poverty and social welfare. The reason for this investigation 
is the thesis that IMF austerity programs, as part of the stabilization 
process sought by the Fund in recipient countries, are often associated 
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with fiscal austerity and a decline in public expenditure, including that on 
social welfare, with large social implications. 
 
Our four countries started their IMF and World Bank guided reforms at 
different times. Morocco was the first to commence in 1983, followed by 
Tunisia in 1986, Jordan in 1989, and Egypt in 1991. We analyze the 
trends in social welfare from the time their programs commenced 
through to 2004. Although starting at different times, all four programs 
displayed similar characteristics. The prescriptions of the IMF and World 
Bank, designed in a package of policy reform known as stabilization and 
structural adjustment programs were typical of the IMF and World Bank, 
embracing policies not much different from the ones prescribed by these 
international institutions to developing countries in other regions, such as 
Latin America and sub-Saharan Africa. In the Arab World, as elsewhere, 
the “Washington Consensus” demanded stabilization measures calling 
for massive cuts in public spending, new and broader taxes, and high and 
positive interest rates. They also called for immediate trade liberalization 
combined with large currency devaluations and massive reduction in 
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tariffs and elimination of non-tariff barriers. Privatization of state-owned 
enterprises, price and financial deregulation also figured prominently in 
every SAL package signed with local governments (Niblock & Murphy, 
1993; Harik & Sullivan, 1992; Vandewalle, 1996; Shafiq, 1998; El-Erian 
et al, 1996).  
 
The available empirical evidence suggests the social implications of 
reform in the Arab world, despite their injection of a strong poverty focus 
in the 1990s, have been disappointing. While surveying eight countries 
that accepted co-operation with the IMF and World Bank in the 1980s 
(Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia, Jordan, Sudan, Turkey, Algeria, and 
Mauritania), El-Ghonemy (1998) found that, despite improvement in 
macroeconomic indicators, the social situation in each reforming country 
got “worse than before reform.” Not only did unemployment and poverty 
increase, but also inequality of income worsened in most of them, except 
in Tunisia. Another more recent study (El-Said, 2002) found that the 
negative social impact of reform had been more severe in countries 
which were subject to international pressure to globalize rapidly, the 
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“good pupils” of the IMF, particularly Morocco, Jordan, Egypt, and 
Algeria. In those four states, unemployment, poverty and inequalities had 
not only been much worse in the late 1990s than in the early 1990s, but 
also much worse than in other states that either followed the 
commandments of the IMF and World Bank less religiously or did not 
cooperate with them at all, such as Syria and Iran. Empirical evidence 
drawn from our four-country case studies is also supportive. 
 
 
 
2a.  Jordan 
Large scale and systemic official corruption, macroeconomic 
mismanagement, an unfavorable shift in the external environment and 
poor policy advice by the international financial institutions were all key 
factors in Jordan’s 1989 acute twin currency and banking crisis 
(Harrigan, El-Said, & Wang, 2006). Immediately following the outbreak 
of the crisis, the Jordanian government signed its first stabilization and 
structural adjustment programs (SALPs), which marked the beginning of 
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what turned out to be a marathon of stabilizations and SALPs that lasted 
for more than 15 years up until 2005. 
 
Typical of the IMF and World Bank programs, severe fiscal austerity 
measures were immediately imposed on the Jordanian economy, which 
was already suffering from contracted economic activities, a high level of 
foreign debt, and spiraling inflation, causing the collapse of the Jordanian 
Dinar, which lost almost 50 per cent of its value during early 1989. 
Worse, the IMF in particular insisted on expenditure reduction in a 
country where “expenditures were also rigid, leaving little scope for 
expenditure savings” (Mansur & Field, 2004, p. 32). Unable to reduce 
payments on interest or military expenditures (the largest two 
expenditure items in the budget), items that affected the poor most 
became the immediate target of austerity measures. This included food 
and energy subsidies, freezing public sector wages and employment, and 
introducing new cost-recovery charges for education and health. Food 
subsidies alone, which made up 7 per cent of government expenditure (or 
3.3 per cent of GDP) in 1989, were slashed to 2.1 per cent and even to 1 
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per cent of GDP in 1991 and 1994, respectively (IMF, 2004, p. 102). 
This was accompanied by measures that gradually lifted energy subsidies 
and increased utility prices. A new Sales Tax was introduced in 1994, 
after four years of delay, at 7 per cent rate, rising to 10 per cent in 1995 
and to 13 per cent in 1999 after which it was converted to a General Sales 
Tax (GST) (for a more detailed study of the IMF policy 
recommendations and implementation in Jordan, see Harrigan & El-Said, 
2009a; IMF, 2004). 
 
Naturally, introducing severe austerity in such circumstances confronted 
the government with serious poverty and unemployment problems. This 
situation was made worse by the forced return of more than 300, 000 
Jordanians in 1991–2 as a result of the first Gulf war. According to the 
World Bank, the share of the population living under the poverty line 
jumped from 3 per cent in 1987 to over 14 per cent in 1992, before 
declining to under 12 per cent in the late 1990s. Similar upward trends 
were also observed with regard to unemployment (see Table 1). But these 
figures remain highly controversial. Other sources estimated the number 
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of Jordanians living under the poverty line to have risen by two-thirds 
during 1987–91 to 19.8 per cent (Kossaifi, 1998, p. 6). The government 
of Jordan itself has been less optimistic than the IMF and World Bank 
regarding the levels of poverty and unemployment in the country, stating 
that “Depending upon the definitions used, anywhere from fifteen to 
more than thirty per cent of the population falls below the poverty 
threshold”; the same thing “applies to unemployment,” the Jordanian 
government added (Ministry of Social Development, 2003, p. 5). 
 
Table 1.  Jordan: Key Social Indicators 1980-2002 
  
Poverty 
Headcount % 
 
 
Gini Coefficient 
 
 
Unemployment 
 
1980 
 
 
24.0 
 
0.40 
 
4.5% (1983) 
 
1987 
 
 
  3.0 
 
0.36 
 
8.0% 
 
1992 
 
 
14.4 
 
0.40 
 
19.2% 
 
1997 
 
 
11.7 
 
0.36 
 
13.7% (2000) 
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2002 
 
 
15.0-30.0ests. 
 
0.36 
 
15.3% 
 
Sources: MSD, 2003; Poverty Assessment Report, Washington, World 
Bank, 2004a. 
 
During the IMF austerity period when subsidies were greatly reduced, 
Jordan’s social safety net remained weak. The National Aid Fund (NAF) 
emerged as the most “comprehensive” and “single state-funded social 
safety net for the poor and most vulnerable segments of Jordanian 
society” (Zakharova, 2004, p. 111). The NAF’s new role was consistent 
with the IMF and World Bank vision, which sought to substitute NAF for 
the previous general subsidy program as a mechanism, it was argued, to 
enhance the quality of public spending. But even the IMF officials 
acknowledge that “NAF [has major] coverage limitations” (IMF, 2004, p. 
100). The government of Jordan itself also admits that the percentage of 
poor persons receiving NAF recurrent cash assistance to total poor does 
not exceed 40 per cent in best circumstances (Ministry of Social 
Development, 2003, p. 20). 
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Parallel to weak formal safety nets, Jordan’s traditional, informal, and 
family-based social protection, largely relied on prior to 1989 to smooth 
occasional welfare shocks was also weakened during the reform period. 
The rapid rise in poverty and unemployment undermined the traditional 
family source of welfare support (UNDP, 2004, p. 62, El-Said & 
Harrigan, 2009).  Poor Jordanian families’ ability to participate in social 
ceremonies and networks (an important mechanism to build social 
capital) has been weakened because they “could not afford having a 
social life or attending social events like wedding parties or exchanging 
visits with their neighbours …” (DFID, 2001, pp. 18 and 22).   
 
Following the stabilization phase of reform, Jordan witnessed two spurts 
of economic growth in the period under analysis, namely 1992-5 when 
growth registered an annual average of 8.6 per cent and 2000-04 when it 
averaged 4.81 per cent. However, we have shown elsewhere (Harrigan & 
El-Said, 2009a, pp. 75-104) that this growth was not sustained. Rather 
than being sustainable growth brought about by productivity increases, 
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growth was largely extensive and unsustainable, brought about by factor 
accumulation. In addition, much of the growth was in the non-tradable 
sectors, especially the construction sector, rather than being the type of 
sustainable export-led growth one would normally expect from World 
Bank reform programs. The brief period of growth 1992-5 was 
accompanied by poverty reduction but Jordan’s growth spurt in the 1990s 
was much more short-lived than that in Egypt and Morocco, and as a 
result the decline in poverty from 14.4 per cent in 1992 to 11.7 per cent 
in the late 1990s was less marked (see Table 1). Jordan’s first growth 
phase was not sustained and as growth collapsed, poverty again increased 
from 11.7 per cent of the population in 1997 to the government’s claim 
that poverty was anywhere between 15 per cent and 30 per cent by 2002 
(see Table 1). Hence, by the year 2002, after over a decade of IMF and 
World Bank guided reforms, poverty was significantly above its 3.0 per 
cent level of 1987. In addition unemployment has also gone up during the 
reform period from 8 per cent in 1987 to 15.3 per cent in 2002 (see Table 
1).   
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It is notoriously difficult to ascribe causation in terms of the increase in 
poverty and unemployment to reform programs (Cornia, Jolly & Stewart, 
1987). However, undoubtedly some of the increase in poverty and 
unemployment in Jordan was a result of the reform measures introduced. 
As argued above, fiscal austerity under the IMF led to cut backs in 
government expenditure on social welfare, reduced employment in the 
public sector, a freeze on civil service wages and salaries as well as 
reductions in subsidies. World Bank reforms such as privatization and 
trade liberalization contributed to unemployment whilst reforms in the 
agricultural sector such as the removal of subsidies on farm inputs led to 
increased rural impoverishment (Harrigan et al, 2006). 
 
2b.  Egypt 
The general welfare state system in place since the Nasserite revolution 
has meant that Egypt has made tremendous strides in improving different 
dimensions of social welfare since 1952. The aggressive ration and 
subsidy program was effective in protecting the food security of the 
majority of the population and the system favors the poor relatively more 
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than the rich (World Bank, 1991, p. 58; Alderman & von Braun, 1984). 
Income distribution remained fairly stable and improved somewhat in the 
1980s as a result of both economic growth and distributive policies, 
including land redistribution. By 1991 when the Economic Reform and 
Structural Adjustment Programme (ERSAP) was launched, Egypt had a 
more egalitarian income distribution than many comparator countries. 
Despite the large improvements in social welfare indicators, the onset of 
economic crisis at the end of the 1980s hampered continued 
improvements. By the time the ERSAP was launched in 1991, it was 
obvious that the economic crisis was exacerbating poverty and that the 
government’s social safety net was inadequate (World Bank, 1991). 
After a long period of economic growth the Egyptian economy faced 
crisis by the end of the 1980s. Growth had been based on a rentier 
economy model with rents in the form of aid, migrant remittances, oil, 
and Suez Canal revenue boosting an otherwise inward looking and 
interventionist economy. With the collapse in oil prices in the 1980s this 
model of growth could no longer be sustained and by the late 1980s 
Egypt faced a major external debt problem, high inflation, a large budget 
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deficit, and an unsustainable balance of payments. Her support for the 
Allies in the first Gulf War brought a huge debt forgiveness package and 
an IMF and World Bank policy-based lending exercise designed to 
support a program of economic liberalization. 
 
The first phase of the reform program consisted of a rapid period of 
stabilization in which the fiscal deficit was dramatically improved, 
inflation brought down, and the nominal exchange rate stabilized. This 
attracted a large surge of capital inflows, yet Egypt managed to avoid the 
financial sector and currency crises so often associated with such inflows. 
Structural adjustment however, was much slower. Although progress was 
made with trade liberalization and privatization, Egypt remained a 
largely inward looking economy and the growth that materialized in the 
1990s was based on domestic demand not export-led growth. By the turn 
of the century this growth had slowed considerably and in 2004 a more 
reformist government was appointed by the President to speed up the 
pace of structural reform. 
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Despite a well thought out poverty alleviation strategy for the reform 
period as articulated in World Bank (1991), including prioritizing 
subsidies and social welfare expenditure for the neediest, protection of 
government expenditure on health and education, and the creation of a 
Social Fund, not all of the strategy was implemented during the ERSAP. 
As a result, poverty trends were mixed during the reform period. Two 
Household Income, Expenditure and Consumption Surveys carried out in 
1995–6 and 1999–2000 enabled the World Bank and the Government to 
present a detailed analysis of poverty trends in the reform period (World 
Bank, 2002) and it is possible to construct a detailed picture of poverty 
trends in the first decade of the ERSAP as presented in Table 2. 
 
Table 2 shows that, according to two measures, the national poverty line 
headcount and the US$2/day measure, poverty worsened between 1990–
1 and 1995–6. If so, this is not surprising. The rapid stabilization program 
in the first half of the 1990s took place before the government had 
sensitized itself to the issue of poverty and it seems that there was a 
willingness to push for stabilization and liberalization with an acceptance 
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of short-term negative social consequences in the hope that eventually 
growth would trickle down. Other studies also confirm this trend (El-
Laithy & Osamn, 1997; Cardiff, 1997; El-Laithy et al, 1999). By 
contrast, all indicators show an unambiguous improvement in poverty in 
the second half of the 1990s. Again, this is not surprising. By the mid-
1990s the difficult phase of rapid stabilization, including a swift 
improvement in the government’s deficit, had been successfully 
completed, structural reforms were only slowly implemented and the 
government embarked upon a more expansionary policy bringing a short 
phase of economic growth. According to the Bank the moderate poverty 
improvements of the latter part of the 1990s were the first since the early 
1980s, and the World Bank report (2002) indicated that by 1999– 2000 
poverty in Egypt stood at 16.7 per cent using the lower national poverty 
line.  
 
Table 2:  Poverty Trends in Egypt 1990-2000 (per cent of population) 
  
1990-91 
 
 
1995-96 
 
1999-2000 
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Lower National Poverty Line 
Headcount 
24.32 19.41 16.74 
 
Poverty Gap (Nat. poverty line) 
 
7.08 
 
3.39 
 
2.97 
 
National Poverty line Headcount 
 
49.27 
 
51.43 
 
42.63 
 
Poverty Gap (Nat. poverty line) 
 
16.98 
 
13.92 
 
10.83 
 
Poverty Line at US$/day PPP 
Headcount 
 
8.24 
 
2.50 
 
0.68 
 
Poverty Gap 
 
2.27 
 
0.33 
 
0.07 
 
Poverty Line at US$2/day PPP 
Headcount 
 
39.45 
 
41.52 
 
24.84 
 
Poverty Gap 
 
12.41 
 
9.93 
 
5.00 
 
Food Poverty Line 
 
8.93 
 
3.05 
 
2.87 
 
Source: El-Saharty et al, 2005 
The 2002 World Bank report also dissected regional trends in poverty. 
Even though for the nation as a whole poverty improved between 1995–6 
and 1999–2000, with the greatest improvement in the Metropolitan area 
and moderate improvement in Lower Egypt, this was not the case for 
Upper Egypt where the poverty incidence increased substantially from 
29.3 per cent to 34.2 per cent in rural areas and from 10.8 per cent to 19.3 
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per cent in urban areas. The depth and severity of poverty also increased 
in Upper Egypt, which has traditionally been the poorest region in Egypt. 
As a result, the previous national urban/rural poverty divide was replaced 
by a regional poverty divide. The reason for the new regional poverty 
divide was the regionally biased pattern of growth during the late 1990s. 
Import substituting manufacturing, the construction sector, and trading 
fuelled by expansionary policies grew rapidly in the second half of the 
1990s and these activities were concentrated around the Metropolitan 
area and Lower Egypt with its proximity to the large Metropolitan area 
whilst Upper Egypt experienced virtually no growth. This helped create 
jobs and reduce poverty in Lower and Metropolitan Egypt.  
 
The above indicators of poverty have all used money metrics. One 
broader indicator which confirms the pattern observed above is child 
malnutrition. In the first half of the 1990s there was an alarming increase 
in the percentage of children under 5 who were malnourished and 
underweight. This is not surprising given that we have already seen that 
this was a period in which poverty as a whole increased according to the 
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national poverty line and stabilization was aggressively pursued with 
little concern for social welfare. 
 
In spite of the rosy gloss put on poverty trends in the second half of the 
1990s by the World Bank (2002), bank officials acknowledge that 
poverty is likely to have increased since 2000 and that the poverty and 
employment gains of the second half of the 1990s are probably 
unsustainable (personal interviews, Cairo, August 2005). Using the 
2004–5 Household Survey, poverty was estimated to have increased to 
19.6 per cent compared to 16.74 per cent in 1999–2000 using the lower 
national poverty line, whilst for Upper Egypt the figure was around 40 
per cent. One of the main reasons for this seems to be that of rising prices 
in the face of devaluations of the Egyptian pound and reductions in 
subsidies. In fact, despite robust economic growth between 2004-08, the 
available empirical evidence points to a definite increase in poverty 
levels in Egypt. As Lynch (2008) noted:  
“Although the last ambitious economic reforms launched in 2004 
have won plaudits from the business community they have done 
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little for the average Egyptian. Poverty, in fact, has increased 
slightly over the past three years despite an economy growing at an 
annual rate of about 7%. That disconnect raises questions about 
whether the government can sustain its reforms amid mounting 
labor unrest and a generalized air of complaint.” 
One clear indicator that poverty has increased since 2000 is the rise in 
child malnutrition, an indicator closely linked to poverty trends. Between 
2000 and 2004 the percentage of under-five year olds who were 
underweight more than doubled from 4.0 per cent to 8.6 per cent. To 
quote the Bank: “Given that poverty in Egypt is shallow, there is a 
chance that many of those whom escaped poverty during the 1995–2000 
period may have slipped back into poverty again” (World Bank, 2002, 
p.v).  
 
Summarizing the above it would seem that during the ERSAP period 
Egypt experienced mixed results in terms of the social consequences of 
stabilization and structural adjustment. In the first half of the 1990s 
stabilization was aggressively pursued with little regard for poverty and 
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social welfare. As a result the number below the national poverty line 
increased and child malnutrition also increased. In the second half of the 
1990s there was a spurt of economic growth and poverty for Egypt as a 
whole fell (although not for Upper Egypt), employment increased2, and 
unemployment fell. However, this was not sustained and since 2000 
poverty and unemployment has again been increasing. Taking these 
trends for the reform period as a whole, many Egyptians feel their living 
standards have declined since the ERSAP was launched in 1991 and that 
poverty has got worse and many are now looking to alternative sources 
of welfare provision. 
 
2c.  Morocco 
Morocco, like many other MENA states, has a long history of populist 
state welfare provision in the form of an implicit Social Contract 
whereby the state provides for its citizens in return for loyalty to the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  Exports did little to help address poverty and unemployment in Egypt as indicated by the stagnant  
share of labor-intensive products in the export basket since 1990 and the growth of capital-intensive 
exports. Growth was concentrated in the non-tradable sectors serving the domestic market – 
construction, inward-looking manufacturing, services, and government employment, which, given the 
limited size of the domestic market spending on non-tradables were not sustainable sources of income 
growth as seen by the decline in growth after 2000. 
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regime. However, although the country has made huge strides since 
independence in improving social welfare, most of its social welfare 
indicators remain below those of comparable lower middle-income 
countries. This is because state welfare provision, although based on a 
populist model, has been biased towards urban areas and the better off 
(Walle, 2004, p. 1). Since the early 1980s the government has no longer 
commanded the resources it needs to sustain the Social Contract.  
 
A weakness of social policy in Morocco is the inadequacy of social 
safety nets to protect the most vulnerable such that indicators like child 
malnutrition are much higher than in comparator countries. Most safety 
net programs are ad hoc and fail to catch many of the poor when they are 
adversely affected by livelihood shocks. The lack of organized social 
safety nets became particularly evident during the stabilization policies of 
the mid- to late-1980s when the poor were hit by subsidy reductions and 
increased living costs. 
In the midst of the economic crisis of the early 1980s, austerity measures 
and structural reform measures were introduced under the auspices of the 
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IMF and World Bank. Trends in poverty and social welfare have 
fluctuated since these programs were introduced and follow a similar 
pattern to those witnessed in Egypt. In the first part of the 1980s poverty 
and social welfare both deteriorated. With the generation of export-led 
growth from the mid-1980s to the early-1990s poverty improved 
significantly. However, this was not sustained and in the economic 
slowdown of the 1990s poverty crept back up again to levels 
commensurate with the early 1980s. During the period 2000-4, Morocco 
experienced an economic upturn and poverty again declined but much of 
this growth was based on domestic demand rather than on exports. 
 
Morocco launched its IMF and World Bank-guided reform program in 
1983, when the powerful King Hassan II turned to the IMF and World 
Bank, leading to a ten-year long stabilization program promoted by the 
IMF accompanied by a series of structural adjustment and sectoral loans 
with the World Bank aimed at addressing Morocco’s macroeconomic and 
structural imbalances. As in Jordan, Egypt, Tunisia, and elsewhere, the 
Fund and the Bank called for, amongst other things, fiscal consolidation 
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in return for support. Fiscal consolidation was achieved by reducing 
absorption, mainly by lowering public investment. Government capital 
expenditure fell by half in real terms between 1983 and 1986, with large, 
negative consequences for development and operations of both economic 
infrastructural and social facilities. It was not surprising that cutting 
public investment, along with raising interest rates (a key condition in the 
IMF’s stabilization package), also drastically reduced private investment, 
especially in rural areas where large segments of the population lived. In 
addition, Morocco’s entire rural economy depends heavily on public 
investment for infrastructure, extension services, fertilizers, and 
mechanization. Reducing public investment in rural areas led to delays in 
the provision of infrastructure (transportation, telecommunication, etc) 
and social sector services (education, health, training, houses, etc), with 
severe implications for the poor in rural areas (Hamdouch, 1998; Achy & 
Hamdouch, 2003). 
 
The initial years of reforms also involved severe fiscal austerity in the 
form of a civil service wage freeze from 1981–5, limited public sector 
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recruitment to 10,000 per year for three years, higher taxation, a cut in 
subsidies with sugar, oil, and flour prices up by 30 per cent, 52 per cent 
and 87 per cent respectively. In addition the prices of about 45 products 
were decontrolled between 1983 and 1985 and the price of subsidized 
food, fertilizers, electricity, water, and petroleum were increased.  
 
Macroeconomically, the reform measures were considered a success; the 
budget deficit was reduced from 10.9 per cent of GDP in 1983–4 to 2.6 
per cent in 1992–3 and inflation was brought under control and declined 
from 12.5 per cent in 1984 to less than 3 per cent in 1988 (Achy & 
Hamdouch, 2003, p. 19). 
The social impact of stabilization, however, has been dramatic. As in 
Jordan, figures regarding poverty and unemployment have been 
contentious and highly debatable. For example, while the official 
unemployment rate in Morocco was 17 per cent in 1989, “in reality 
[unemployment was] probably closer to 20–25 per cent” (Joffe, 1992, p. 
142). Similarly, the unofficial but generally recognized poverty rates 
were much higher than publicly published figures. Anecdotal evidence 
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(such as a decline in the primary school enrolment rate, continued high 
illiteracy rate, rapid rural–urban migration) pointed to higher poverty 
rates than formally recognized. In fact, the social impact of reform was 
so traumatizing that the Moroccan government terminated its agreement 
with the IMF in 1993 although it continued to collaborate with the World 
Bank on sectoral basis (Hamdouch, 1998, p. 17). 
 
The stabilization effort of the early 1980s brought a brief contraction in 
economic growth but growth resumed during the period from the mid-
1980s to the early-1990s. But an improved growth rate was caused by 
exceptionally good weather conditions and growth in the export sector, 
not by IMF austerity measures. During this period, official poverty fell 
(see Table 3) from 21 per cent in 1984 to 13 per cent by 1991. The 
success came from generating labor-intensive economic growth which 
created considerable employment opportunities for the poor. 
 
Poverty reduction in urban areas was driven by government policies to 
boost industry and exploit its historically close ties with the EU. This led 
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to rapid expansion of employment in the manufacturing sector, especially 
in export-orientated enterprises such as textiles, leather, and agro-
industries, and by a rapid growth in the informal sector. Labor-intensive 
growth was partly due to the relative decline in labor costs and an 
increase in capital costs. Throughout the period real wages fell, 
particularly in the manufacturing sector where there was a move towards 
temporary low-skilled employment. But employment gains more than 
made up for this in terms of the impact on poverty and increases in the 
minimum wage protected the very poor.  
 
Table 3: Morocco National Poverty Headcount 
 
1984 
 
1991 
 
2000 
 
2005 
 
 
21% 
 
 
13% 
 
19% 
 
14% (19%)* 
 
* In fact, while official rates of poverty were estimated to be 14 per cent 
in 2005, just one year earlier the World Bank’s Poverty Report (2004b, p. 
2) estimated poverty in Morocco at 19 per cent. The same Report also 
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added that “another 25% of the population is considered ‘economically 
vulnerable’,” and need careful monitoring (Ibid).  
 
Rural poverty also declined in the latter part of the 1980s largely due to 
good weather, which created rapid agricultural growth. During the 1980s 
the agricultural sector grew by an annual average of 8 per cent, twice the 
rate of overall economic growth. Private sector investment in agriculture 
increased by about 31 per cent. per annum in nominal terms between 
1985 and 1991. Although this mainly benefited the irrigated areas, the 
latter provided a major source of employment for the rural poor, who 
relied more on wage employment than on land ownership. The rise in the 
agricultural minimum wage also helped alleviate rural poverty. Hence 
agriculture made a major contribution to the increase in rural incomes. 
 
Government expenditure trends also contributed to the decline in poverty 
in the late 1980s to early 1990s. After an initial sharp reduction in 
government expenditures in the first phase of stabilization between 
1983–8, expenditure started to rise again in the late 1980s. The 
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government made a firm effort to protect social expenditures with public 
expenditure on health only falling from 1.1 per cent of GDP to 0.9 per 
cent of GDP between 1982 and 1991 and expenditure on education only 
falling from 6.2 per cent GDP to 5.3 per cent.  
 
Macroeconomic stabilization, particularly in the form of inflation 
reduction, financial sector reform including higher interest rates and 
exchange rate polices, also contributed to a surge in migrant remittances 
which by 1991 accounted for 11 per cent of private consumption and 7.5 
per cent of GDP. These remittances played an important role in boosting 
incomes including those of the poor. The World Bank has estimated that 
about 180,000 or 5 per cent of the estimated poor in 1991 would be 
added to the number of the poor if it were not for transfers from abroad 
(World Bank, 1994, p. 26). 
 
However, although poverty fell from the mid-1980s to the early-1990s, a 
large number of the population remained close to the poverty line and 
thus vulnerable to even small deteriorations in economic conditions. This 
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was clearly illustrated during the 1990s when an economic slowdown, 
particularly in the manufacturing sector, and droughts reduced growth to 
an annual average of only 2 per cent and increased poverty from 13 per 
cent in 1991 to 19 per cent in 2000 (see Table 3). 
 
The rise in poverty rates to 19 per cent in the latter part of the 1990s 
meant that 5.3 million were poor in Morocco. During the 1990s the 
number of people just above the poverty line also increased such that 12 
million were economically vulnerable. The depth and severity of poverty 
also increased during the latter 1990s particularly in rural areas. For 
example, the number of extreme poor, that is, those living beneath the 
food poverty line (the threshold that distinguishes those with only enough 
means to maintain minimum calorific intake required for survival) 
increased in rural areas from 255,000 people in 1990–1 to 844,000 in 
1998–9. This increase in poverty occurred despite an increase in 
government expenditure on social protection from 9 per cent of GDP in 
the late 1980s to 12.5 per cent in 1998 equivalent to 43 per cent of total 
government expenditure. In particular, social security outlays increased 
37	  
	  
as did expenditure on drought relief and rural public works schemes, but 
still fell well short of requirements. 
 
The economic slowdown of the 1990s can be partly explained by an 
appreciation of the real exchange rate (which appreciated by 17 per cent 
in the 1990s), poor infrastructure, drought (almost one every two years 
during the 1990s), and a decline in agricultural investment. External 
causes included the economic recession in Europe, a slow-down in DFI 
and deterioration in terms of trade resulting from falling phosphate prices 
and rising oil prices due to the crisis in the Middle East. Growth turned 
negative in 1992 and 1993 and remained low for the rest of the decade. 
During this period unemployment grew and low labor productivity meant 
that real wages could not be increased without losing international 
competitiveness. Hence, increasing labor productivity became essential 
for further poverty reduction and this did not materialize. Demographic 
pressures also added to the unemployment and poverty increase. Between 
1985 and the end of the 1990s unemployment rose from 11.5 per cent to 
15 per cent with most of the increase concentrated in urban areas. The 
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growth of urban unemployment during the 1990s was fuelled by rural to 
urban migration and to a lesser extent by growth in the population and 
rising labor force participation rates. The appreciation of the real 
exchange rate during this period also had adverse effects on 
unemployment by encouraging a return to more capital-intensive 
production methods. Urban unemployment peaked in 1995 at 23 per cent. 
One marked feature of the increase in unemployment has been the extent 
to which it has hit the young and the educated. Growing urban 
unemployment has been accompanied by an increase in urban slums 
(World Bank, 2006). Although poverty remains predominantly rural in 
Morocco, the 2004 Census on Population and Housing showed a clear 
increase in the incidence of urban poverty. 
 
Other non-income indicators of poverty also deteriorated in the early 
1990s. For example between 1987 and 1992 the nutritional status of 
children declined. Non-income measures of poverty were adversely 
affected by the fact that not enough income was channeled into 
categories of public spending which help the poor such as primary health 
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and education and essential infrastructure services. In addition, the 
quality of health care and education deteriorated as expenditures failed to 
keep pace with population growth. The growth of poverty during the 
1990s has led the Bank to conclude that although Morocco was 
successful in the mid- to late-1980s in terms of growth and poverty 
reduction this had fallen short in the 1990s (World Bank, 1997).  
 
As growth picked up again since 2000, official sources believed that 
poverty had fallen to 14 per cent in 2005. However, no accurate figures 
for poverty rates existed, and these figures are highly contentious. The 
World Bank believes that poverty remained at the same level as it was in 
2000 (see Table 3). It is true that between 2000 and 2004, GDP growth 
increased to 4.5 per cent per annum with strong growth in agriculture due 
to favorable weather (agricultural growth accelerated from -1.3 per cent 
in the 1990s to an annual average of 8.2 per cent in the early years of the 
2000s) and in manufacturing, services, tourism, and IT. But the 
employment opportunities as a result of this growth have not been 
sufficiently high enough to achieve a big dent in poverty or even 
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unemployment. According to World Bank officials, Morocco needs an 
annual average growth rate of 7–8 per cent in order to cause a real dent in 
poverty and unemployment. A 5 per cent growth rate, they add, will only 
prevent the current levels of poverty and unemployment from 
deteriorating (cited in Achy & Hamdouch, 2003, p. 25). It remains to be 
seen whether the growth upturn of the 2000s translates into sustainable 
long-term growth and poverty reduction. Much of this growth is based on 
remittances and tourism receipts along with growth of domestic demand 
and agriculture as opposed to being export driven.  
 
Poverty reduction in Morocco is firmly on the Bank’s agenda in the new 
millennium. In the 2005–9 Country Assistance Strategy (World Bank, 
2005) the “overarching objective” of the strategy was poverty reduction 
in response to lackluster economic growth, inadequate social indicators 
relative to the country’s income levels, and high unemployment. 
Coinciding with a greater Bank emphasis on poverty and social exclusion 
was a major re-orientation of government policy in the same direction. 
Shocked by the vast disparities between rural and urban areas, as well as 
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by a rapid rise in the level of poverty and unemployment, the government 
introduced in 1997 the Social Priority Programme. The accession to the 
throne of King Mohammed VI in 1999 marked a major turning point in 
political and social policy in Morocco. Under the new King not only was 
economic reform sped up, but considerable emphasis was placed on 
social policy.  
 
2d.  Tunisia 
Unlike Jordan, Egypt, and Morocco, the implementation of Bretton 
Woods policy packages did not lead to an increase in poverty or the 
disengagement of the state in social provisioning in Tunisia. On the 
contrary, throughout the 20 years of structural adjustment started in 1986, 
the Tunisian government has reformed, but preserved its strong role in 
social provisioning. As a result, poverty has been reduced considerably, 
while inequality has remained stable. Admittedly, there remain some 
pockets of poverty especially in rural areas, and social problems such as 
unemployment have persisted, but on aggregate, it can be argued that 
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Tunisia was successful in implementing structural reforms while 
simultaneously reducing poverty. 
 
The commitment to social development has always been part of the 
Tunisian government’s priorities. Since independence, social spending 
had remained high, making it one of Tunisia’s key characteristics. In 
2004, social spending represented 16 to 20 per cent of GDP depending on 
the measure (Ben Romdhane, 2006), and in 2003 social transfers were 
equal to 258.4 Tunisian Dinars (TD) per household per month, that is 1.2 
times the guaranteed minimum wage. In fact, Tunisia is the highest social 
spender in the MENA region. There was particularly large spending in 
education, health, and diverse social welfare programs such as maternity 
benefits, food subsidies, and aid for poor families. These large social 
transfers translated into impressive social achievements. Most impressive 
has been the reduction in poverty; according to the INS, in 1975, 22 per 
cent of the population lived under the national poverty line; by 1985 this 
rate was reduced to 7.7 per cent. Improvements in human indicators were 
equally impressive, in particular for women. Overall, the commitment to 
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social policies prior to structural reform implied a dramatic improvement 
in the well-being of a majority of Tunisians. 
 
In 1986, Tunisia implemented stabilization and structural reforms in 
association with the World Bank and the IMF. The reforms were a 
relative success, with key macro indicators stabilized and, unlike Jordan, 
Egypt, and Morocco, continued economic growth during the stabilization 
phase. The structural adjustment phase was very gradual and 
implemented through a twenty-year period, and consisted of the 
traditional structural reform policies: trade liberalization, financial 
liberalization, price liberalization and privatization. The reforms were 
relatively successful in diversifying the economy, maintaining a 
relatively high level of growth rates, but little improvements were made 
in private investment levels and employment creation. 
 
The implementation of structural reforms in 1986 could, in theory, have 
jeopardized the commitment to social provision in Tunisia and led to an 
increase in poverty. In fact, just before the reform, there were signs that 
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the World Bank and IMF might push for a reduction in the social 
spending, since in 1983 these organizations were quite influential in 
pushing for a reform of the food subsidy system which at the time cost 
almost 4 per cent of GDP, sucking out fragile government finance. The 
price of wheat, flour, and semolina were increased by 70 per cent and the 
price of bread by 100 per cent in 1984 (Ben Romdhane, 2006). The 
reform inevitably led to street riots which spread across the country, and 
after a month of protests and riots the price increase was abolished and 
calm restored. The Tunisian government learned from the failure of the 
drastic subsidy reform and subsequently succeeded in preserving social 
policy throughout the structural reform. 
 
During the two phases of structural reforms (1987–94 and 1995–2005), 
social spending as a proportion of GDP has been maintained at around 19 
per cent, representing a two-fold increase in social spending in constant 
terms. Social transfer per habitant increased by 55 per cent, from 386 TD 
in 1987 (representing 0.8 times the minimum wage) to 599.3TD in 2002 
(representing 1.2 times the minimum wage) (Ben Romdhane, 2006). All 
45	  
	  
sectors apart from the General Compensation Fund saw an increase in 
spending in constant terms: spending on education and health both 
doubled during that period, while social welfare spending increased by 
214 per cent -an average annual increase of 13.4 %.  
 
During the 1986–2002 period, the government was under pressure from 
the World Bank to reform its social protection system (see for example 
World Bank, 1996; Dimitri, 1993), and to some extent the Tunisian 
government has responded to many of those pressures (for example, the 
government reformed the food subsidy system and the health 
compensation system). But the government has also created new 
institutions that systematically compensate the losers of these reforms. 
Furthermore, the period was characterized by an expansion of the social 
security system, which, however, is not financed by the government 
budget. 
 
One significant reform during the adjustment program concerns the 
General Compensation Fund (GCF) (food subsidy system), which led to 
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the most drastic drop in spending by the government. After the bread 
riots of 1984, the government opted for a self-targeted system with a 
gradual reduction in subsidies. In effect, government spending on GCF 
decreased by almost 52 per cent. Ben Romdhane (2006) however, 
highlights that each increase in basic food prices tended to be followed 
by an increase in the minimum wage. Furthermore, in order to 
compensate the poor for the increase in basic food price the National 
Programme for Aid to Needy Families (NAPNF) was created in 1986. 
Under this scheme, households receive on average 478 TD per annum, on 
top of free medical care. During the Structural Adjustment period, there 
has been great expansion of the social security system with two-fold 
increase in membership and a large increase in amount spent in 
contributions, with pension and health capturing the largest share in 
expenditure (Ben Romdhane, 2006).  
 
The most significant change in social provisioning during the reform 
period, or, rather, the most original one, has been the set up of 
Presidential programs by Ben Ali. These are partly financed by the 
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government, but mostly, funding comes from the private sector (Hibou, 
2006; Ben Romdhane, 2006). The two most important programs are the 
National Solidarity Fund (NSF or project 26:26) and the National Job 
Fund (NJF or project 21:21). The NSF fund (created in 1993) offers a 
series of programs directed at low-income groups and covers needs and 
activities not provided by existing public schemes. The National Job 
Fund was set up in 2000 to promote job creation and provides support for 
micro-investment projects and training. Other Presidential programs such 
as the “Back to School” Program and the Religious Festival Program are 
also in place. These programs are likely to have contributed to some 
improvements in social conditions and to some extent cushioned the 
impact of the second phase of the reform. The Presidential programs cost 
little to the government since a majority of the funding comes from the 
private sector through the form of supposedly voluntary contribution by 
employers. As a result, a whole proportion of social provisioning in 
Tunisia is directly financed by the private sector, allowing the 
government to increase social provisioning while keeping its budget 
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under control (simultaneously satisfying the IMF and World Bank budget 
deficit targets). 
 
Overall, despite some reduction in social spending in the GCF for 
example, the structural adjustment period in Tunisia has been one of 
social provisioning expansion with increased spending per capita in 
education, health, and social welfare throughout the period. As a result, 
that period also translated into impressive improvement in the social 
conditions of most Tunisians, with a significant decrease in poverty 
between 1986 and 2002, therefore continuing the trend of the 1960s to 
1980s. 
 
After the reduction in poverty from 22 to 9.6 per cent in the 1975–85 
period, poverty continued to decrease, and in 2000 reached 4.1 per cent; a 
drop in the number of people from half a million in 1985 to 400, 000 in 
2000 (see Table 4). During that period, poverty increased between 1990 
and 1995 (from 6.7 per cent to 8.1 per cent), mainly because of droughts 
between 1993 and 1995, impacting agricultural production and increasing 
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inequality (Ghali & Mohnen, 2004). The second half of the 1990s largely 
compensated for that increase, and poverty was halved between 1995 and 
2000 (ironically this drop occurred in the most intensive liberalization 
phase in Tunisia). 
 
Table 4:  Poverty Incidence in Tunisia (Regional Headcount, 1980-
2000) 
 
Region 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 
Greater Tunis 4.3 2.3 2.1 2.4 1 
 
North East 15.6 8.9 5.9 6.3 3.5 
 
North West 30.1 17.9 14.3 11.1 3.7 
Centre West 33.8 18 12.5 20 10.8 
Centre East 16.5 6.2 3.9 3.5 1.9 
 
South West 13 6.7 8.8 8.2 6.4 
 
South East 15.7 12.1 3.1 10.5 6 
 
All Tunisia 
 
20.1 9.6 6.7 8.1 4.1 
 
Source: Ayadi et al, 2005. 
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Table 4 shows that there are strong regional disparities, and that poverty 
is particularly concentrated in the west of the country. The North, North 
West, and Centre East, which have benefited from particularly strong 
growth rates through tourism and offshore activities, are the regions that 
saw the most impressive drops in poverty.   
 
Consumption poverty reduction in Tunisia has been matched by a drop in 
capability poverty. Education has seen the most improvement in both 
primary and secondary levels.  Adult literacy rate has also increased 
dramatically from 53 per cent in 1984 to 86 per cent in 2000. Women 
remained behind with 17 per cent of adult women still illiterate. 
Reduction in consumption poverty has also been accompanied by an 
improvement in health status. Tunisian women and men lived, 
respectively, 9 and 7 years longer in 2004 as compared to 1985, while 
under-five child mortality rate was reduced from 70 per thousand live 
births in 1985 to 25.4 per thousand live births.  Tunisia has achieved 
better health indicators than average for lower-middle income and 
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middle-income countries (World Bank, 2000). Infrastructure data are 
scarce, but by combining World Bank data with National Household 
Survey data it can be shown that there has been a large improvement in 
access to basic infrastructure by the poor in both urban and rural areas, 
but with rural population still lagging behind urban population. 
 
During the structural reform, reduction in poverty has been stronger in 
urban as compared to rural areas; between 1985 and 2000, poverty 
decreased by 65 per cent in urban areas, but only decreased by 56 per 
cent in rural areas. The structural reforms as such, are unlikely to have 
helped poverty reduction in rural areas, since the reforms have mostly 
benefited middle and large private farmers (King, 2003; World Bank, 
2000). Similarly, further liberalization of agricultural markets under the 
EU agreement and World Bank pressure is unlikely to work in favor of 
the rural poor. Agricultural activities are likely to struggle to compete 
internationally, affecting mostly those who already constitute a large 
proportion of the rural poor: small farmers and landless agricultural 
workers.  
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Despite impressive improvements in poverty during the reform period, 
structural reforms in Tunisia failed to redress the high unemployment 
rate the country has been experiencing for more than twenty years. At a 
probably underestimated 14 per cent at the national level, the 
unemployment rate is relatively high amongst the poor (22 per cent of the 
unemployed are poor). One of the reasons for high unemployment rates 
is likely to be the extremely rigid labor market legislation making it 
almost impossible to lay off workers. Ironically, these legislations are 
there to protect workers and make them less vulnerable to poverty, but 
they also prevent potential new entrants entering the labor market and 
therefore growing out of poverty. High unemployment rates are also 
related to low investment levels and the wide gap between employment 
creation in urban as compared to rural areas. Unemployment is also 
particularly high for young graduates and first-time job seekers. 
Unemployment is likely to become a growing problem as liberalization 
strengthens with the end of the MFA and the Euro-Med agreement. The 
labor-intensive sectors such as textile and clothing will be the hardest hit; 
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yet these are the sectors which have benefited the poor the most. As a 
result, we would expect further liberalization to increase inequality and 
either freeze poverty trends or worsen poverty rates. 
 
The above discussion suggests three main trends: first, despite 
undergoing a stabilization and structural adjustment program between 
1985 and 2000, that period was characterized by a dramatic reduction in 
income and capability poverty, with a simultaneous drop in inequality. 
Rural areas and the West of the country seem to exhibit strong pockets of 
poverty both in terms of income and capability poverty. The rural/urban 
difference in Tunisia is largely explained by the fact the economic 
development has concentrated in the north and east of the country 
(mostly urban). Finally, the Tunisian government’s commitment to social 
policy, despite its limitations and relative inefficiencies, is likely to have 
played a crucial role in the impressive poverty reduction the country has 
experienced. Nonetheless, it is possible that some of the structural reform 
policies, in particular the food subsidy reform and the agricultural reform 
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have slowed down poverty reduction in rural areas and that poverty has 
been disguised by biased national poverty measures. 
 
Three phenomena explain why the Tunisian government has been so 
committed to social development, and how it managed to implement 
these policies despite pressures from the World Bank and IMF to reduce 
government spending. First, social policy is historically an integral part 
of the Tunisian social contract; second, the Tunisian State had the 
capacity to negotiate with the Bretton Woods Institutions, and finally, 
social policy has been a key source of legitimacy as well as a tool of 
control for the government (Harrigan & El-Said, 2009b, pp.163-7). 
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3. The Debate About Poverty, Inequality, and Social Welfare in 
MENA 
The issue of economic reform and liberalization, on the one hand, and 
poverty, equity, and social welfare provision in MENA, on the other, has 
recently generated some contentious debates. This debate has been 
triggered by a 2003 paper by Adams and Page, which, by using aggregate 
cross-country data, argued that, despite two decades of economic reform 
and liberalization, MENA “entered the 21st century with levels of income 
poverty that were strikingly low,” that “MENA has been able to avoid a 
large increase in poverty despite 15 years of  low economic growth,” and 
that “compared to other developing regions, during the last 20 years the 
Middle east region has become one of the most equal in terms of income 
distribution” (pp. 2027 and 2043).     
 
First, Adams and Page’s aggregate cross country data is not capable of 
explaining what is, or has really been happening inside each individual 
country. For example, they treat the rise and simultaneous fall in the 
incidence of poverty in rural and Urban Egypt respectively as “puzzling,” 
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with the outcome being “puzzled by a set of apparently contradictory 
trends” that cannot be simply explained by aggregate cross country data. 
Adams and Page thus concluded that “more work is needed to clarify 
these [and other] issues” (pp. 2036 and 2043).   
 
Second, poverty figures in MENA are highly contentious and debatable. 
Onlty the World Bank and Adams and Page argue that poverty declined 
in MENA during and after reforms. Most other observers, including 
many MENA governments themselves, question and doubt such claims 
(Harrigan and El-Said, 2009a and 2009b, Harrigan and El-Said, 2010), 
Lets assume for the moment, notwithstanding lack of accurate figures 
and a general agreement on the true levels of poverty in the region, that 
MENA did indeed ‘enter the 21st century with levels of income poverty 
that were strikingly low’ compared to other developing countries. Such a 
statement however, ignores the fact that “the transitional period featured 
not only meager,” and even much lower levels of economic growth 
compared to other developing regions, but also “little change in poverty” 
(Iqbal, 2006, xviii). In fact, so “little progress was made on the poverty 
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front” in MENA during the transition period that “by 2001 approximately 
52 million people were poor, an increase in absolute numbers of poor by 
approximately 11.5 million people, compared with the situation in 1987.” 
(Ibid, xix). 
 
Third, the aggregate and positivist paradigm resorted to by Adams and 
Page to shed light on the link between economic reform and poverty and 
equity in MENA is a “reductionist approach,” tended to over simply 
complex social and political phenomena, and thus “fails to unmask the 
complex processes that underlie” poverty in developing countries in 
general and in rural areas in particular (Sausman, 2011).  Intricate, 
multifaceted and complex reasons behind poverty, such as the nature of 
social capital and social relations, political exclusions and power 
asymmetries are therefore completely ignored. In other words, “Adams 
and Page’s approach is also problematic in terms of generating 
explanations behind their findings… [and] is largely ineffective in 
understanding what should happen because it only deals with how things 
are” (Ibid).    
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Fourth, Adams and Page’s work says little about the link between 
economic reform and social welfare provision, a key objective of this 
paper. Their argument that MENA is more egalitarian than other 
developing countries, and enjoy lower poverty and unemployment rates, 
may imply that social welfare provision experienced little or no change, 
if not even improvement during the transitional period. This picture is 
misleading. As this paper has shown, the transitional period in MENA, 
which was associated with economic reforms promoted by the IMF and 
World Bank to restore macroeconomic balances and change economic 
structure, has also undermined formal social welfare provisions. Even 
World Bank officials admit that “The region’s social safety nets came 
under stress as fiscal resources tightened” (Iqbal, 2006, xix).  
 
Fifth, the World Bank (in Iqbal, 2006) recognizes that while inequality 
levels in MENA are perhaps lower than in many other developing 
regions, little change or improvement in the distribution of income and 
wealth took place in MENA since the mid-1980s. An environment 
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characterized low growth rate with stable income distribution in a largely 
growing population suggests that “the rich stay[ed] rich and the poor 
stay[ed] poor” (Kanbur, 2006, 3). Both the Arab Human Development 
Report (UN, 2009) and the 2012 UNDP (pp. 9 and 18) report adopt this 
view and argue that growth in the region during the transition period 
lacked “social justice” and “continued to benefit a few… mainly 
benefit[ing] establishment elites and excluded the majority of ordinary 
citizens.” According to the UN Human Development Report (UN, 2009, 
242), the richest 20 per cent in MENA today control more than 45 per 
cent of income or expenditure while the poorest 20 per cent control only 
7 per cent of income or expenditure. 
 
Finally, Adams and Page’s approach also failed to take into account the 
perceptions Arab people with regard to the outcome of reforms in general 
and poverty and inequity in particular. The fact that insignificant, if any 
improvement occurred with regard to poverty reduction and income 
distribution in MENA since the mid-1980s, in an environment 
characterized by increased corruption, repression and rent-seeking 
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activities, created a negative impression of economic reforms and human 
development situation in the region. For example, a recent report by the 
World Bank (2008, vi) concluded that the Jordanian “public’s 
perceptions” of the outcome of reforms, including poverty, 
unemployment, and inequities are negative. The UNDP 2012 Report on 
the Arab World concurs and argues that perceptions played a key role in 
triggering the Arab Spring:  
However, what may matter more is citizens’ perceptions of 
inequality combined with an increasing sense of insecurity 
and low expectations for improvement of their position in 
the future. In fact, some evidence presented in this chapter 
suggests that pessimism was rising in the Arab region before 
the Arab Spring” (UNDP, 2012, 64). 
 
As such, Adams and Page’s approach not only failed to predict the 
outbreak of the Arab Spring, but might also have contributed to it by 
providing policy-makers with a misleading picture regarding the outcome 
of economic reform in the region. As the World Bank commented: “some 
may not think poverty a prominent enough issue in the Middle East and 
North Africa… This… image is misleading one. Although the Middle 
East and North Africa has low rate of poverty when compared with other 
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developing regions, the fact remains that one of every five persons there 
can be considered poor (at the $2 PPP international poverty line) and that 
this situation has not improved much since the late 1980s” (Iqbal, 
2006xi). 
 
4. Conclusion 
We have found that in the case of our four countries the relationship 
between economic reform and social welfare in the period between 1983-
2004 was complex and mixed. In Tunisia the state did not disengage 
from social provisioning, rather there was an expansion of state 
provisioning and, as a result, an unambiguous improvement in poverty 
and social welfare during her reform period, contrary to our hypothesis. 
Although the strongest gains in poverty alleviation in Tunisia were made 
before the period of IMF and World Bank reforms, gains continued 
during the reform period with poverty falling to 4.1 per cent in 2000. 
Throughout the reform period social spending by the government 
remained at around 19 per cent of GDP which amounted to a doubling in 
real terms and an increase in per capita spending, whilst the minimum 
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wage also increased. At the same time inequality improved with the Gini 
coefficient decreasing from 0.430 to 0.406. 
 
Although Tunisia, like our other three countries, was under pressure from 
the IMF and World Bank to reform elements of the social contract, 
especially food subsidies, the strong Tunisian state, and bureaucracy it 
was able to argue against this. Reforms that were made, such as a 
reduction in food subsidies, were counterbalanced by other measures 
such as an increase in the minimum wage and the creation in 1986 of the 
National Programme for Aid to Needy Families. However, despite 
Tunisia’s impressive gains in poverty reduction and social welfare 
improvement, there was a much greater improvement in urban poverty 
than in rural poverty with agricultural reforms mainly benefiting the 
larger farmers and further agricultural liberalization is likely to worsen 
rural poverty. In addition, as in our other three countries, unemployment, 
estimated to be 14 per cent in Tunisia, remains a pressing social problem. 
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In our other three country studies, trends in poverty and social welfare 
during the reform period are much more complex. Jordan, Egypt, and 
Morocco all started their reform programs with a period of austerity 
under IMF stabilization programs. This involved cut-backs in public 
expenditure, freezing of public sector wages and salaries and 
employment, reductions in subsidies and increases in taxation. In all 
cases this, not unexpectedly, led to an initial increase in poverty and a 
decline in social welfare. 
 
After their initial stabilization phase with its adverse effects on poverty 
and social welfare, Morocco, Jordan, and Egypt were able to generate 
periods of growth which led to an improvement in poverty. Egypt, 
Morocco, and Jordan’s growth phases were not sustained and as growth 
collapsed, poverty again increased in all three countries.  
In summary, what our studies show is that the early phase of stabilization 
under the IMF program usually leads to a temporary increase in poverty. 
However, this is short-lived, as a successful stabilization helps to 
eventually generate a period of economic growth. All four countries 
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show that poverty reduction is closely associated with labor-intensive 
periods of growth. But we have also seen that, with the exception of 
Tunisia, growth has not been sustained. As growth declines poverty again 
increases. We have shown that growth alone is insufficient to alleviate 
poverty. The pattern of growth is also critically important. The Tunisian 
pattern of growth has shown that intensive rather than extensive growth 
and growth in the tradable rather than the non-tradable sectors is crucial 
for a sustained improvement in poverty. Tunisia’s ability to generate such 
a pattern of growth with sustained export-led and labor-intensive growth 
was due to the fact that she has a strong developmental state that was 
able to pick and support winning industries and preserve her social 
contract. 
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